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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAY 0. BAR.NHAR11 and VIDA 
N. BAR.NIIART, 
PlaiJZtiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
CIVIL SER.VICE E·1IPLOYEES 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIE·F 
Case 
No. 
10133 
STAT'EMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff Vida Barnhart to re-
cover damages under the Uninsured 1Iotorist coverage 
of her own insurance policy, issued by the defendant, 
for personal injuries sustained by her in an accident with 
an uninsured motorist. 
DISPOSITION IN ·LOWER COURT 
The trial judge, sitting without jury, rendered judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant 
in the amount of $6,182.50. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and appellant seeks reversal of the judg-
ment below. 
T'HE FACTS 
The record on appeal consists essentially of three 
documents. Thy first of these is a folder containing 
papers and pleadings filed by the respective parties, 
minute entries of the court, and similar documents. In 
referring to papers contained in that folder, we shall 
designat~ them by the Initial "R." Secondly there is a 
transcri~t of the proceedings at trial with pages num-
bered separately. References to this transcript are pre- . 
faced by the letters "1Tr." Thirdly, there is an envelope 
containing exhibits received in evidence, and we refer 
to the exhibits by their exhibit numbers. ·The parties are 
designated as they appeared in the court below. Unless 
otherwise indicated by the context, the word plaintiff 
refers to plaintiff Vida Barnhart. The facts are sub-
stantially without dispute. 
O:ri. this appeal two separate and wholly unrelated 
theories are relied upon by appellants. For the conven-
ience of the court, we have divided the facts into separate 
categories pertaining to the legal questions involved: 
(a) the facts of the accident; and (b) the facts relating 
to the insurance coverage. 
A. The Facts of the Accident. 
On September 1, 1962., the plaintiff was involved in 
an automobile collision with an automobile operated by 
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3. 
one Kenneth Danid Welcker. (Tr. 7). The collision 
occurred under the following circumstances : 
The t'ollision occurred on a curve in U.S. Highway 
91 near An1erican Fork, and at approximately the junc-
tion of old highway 91 with new highway 91. (Ex. 2; Tr. 
8, 24). At the place where the accident occurred there 
were two sets of double yellow lines. (Tr. 18-19, 31). 
There was a break in the double yellow lines at the point 
of the intersection of old and new highway 91, permitting 
south bound traffic on highway 91 to make left hand 
turns from new highway 91 onto old highway 91. ('Tr. 
18-19, 31). 
Plaintiff was proceeding southerly along highway 
91 intending to make a left hand turn onto old highway 
91. ('Tr. 48). When she reached the point of the open-
ing in the two sets of double yellow lines she did not 
come to a complete stop, but moved slowly past the 
opening to a point approximately 82 feet south of the 
break in the double yellow lines. She was waiting for 
a break in north bound traffic to permit her to complete 
her left hand turn. (Tr. 31, 48-49). 
W elcker was also proceeding southerly along high-
way 91 and when he approached the break in the yellow 
lines, a north bound truck had started through the break 
intending to make a left hand turn across the south 
bound lanes. (Tr. 11-12). Welcker turned out to avoid 
a collision with this truck, which partially obstructed 
the inside lane for south bound traffic, in which he was 
traveling. As he turned around the truck, he observed, 
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for the first time, the plaintiff's automobile. (Tr. 12~13). 
He applied brakes but was unable to stop in time to 
avoid a collision. (Tr. 8). The accident occurred 82 
feet south of the opening in the double yellow lines. (Tr. 
31). 
B. The facts as to Insurance Coverage. 
On April 10, 1962, defendant Civil Service Employ-
ees Insurance Company issued to plaintiff's husband a 
certain insurance policy designated as an automobile 
policy, Serial No. 0014-04-8. The coverage afforded by 
this policy was public liability insurance and uninsured 
motorist insurance. By express provision of the policy, 
the wife of the named insured (plaintiff), during the 
time she occupied the insured automobile, was entitled 
to the benefits of the Uninsured l\fotorist coverage. 
(Ex. 1) This policy was in full force and effect at the 
time of the above mentioned accident. (Ex. 1.) W elcker 
testified that he had no liability insurance. (Tr. 8). 
Plaintiff and her husband commenced this action 
against the defendant under the Uninsured Motorist 
coverage, claiming damages for personal injuries on 
behalf of plaintiff, and property damage and loss of 
consortium on behalf of her husband. (R. 3). However, 
the husband's cause of action was dismissed at the trial 
as not being within the scope of the Uninsured Motorist 
coverage. ( Tr. 4.) 
D'efendant's policy is a standard form automobile 
policy. It is so designed as to permit the writing of 
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several diffen'nt types of autonwbile coverage in one 
document, whether tlw insured desires several coverages; 
or only lilnited coverage. In this instance, the insured 
purchased only public liability insurance, which (in this 
policy) automatically included Uninsured l\Iotorist cover-
age. The policy provisions concerning Uninsured Motor-
ist Coverage are contained in Part IV of the policy. 
The following provisions are of material importance in 
this case: 
"PART IV - FAMILY PROTECTION 
AGAINS'T UNINSURED MOTORISTS 
"1. Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by 
Uninsured Automobiles: To pay all sums which 
the insured or his legal representatives shall be 
legally entitled to recover as damages from the 
owner or operator of an uninsured automobile be-
cause of bodily injury, siclmess or disease, in-
cluding death resulting therefrom, hereinafter 
called 'bodily injury,' sustained by the insured, 
caused by accident and arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of such uninsured auto-
mobile; provided for the purposes of this endorse-
ment, determination as to whether the insured or 
such representative is legally entitled to recover 
such da.mages, and if so the amount thereof, shall 
be made by agreement between the insured for 
such representative and the con1pany, or if they 
fail to agree, by arbitration. 
"6. Arbitration: If any person making claim 
hereunder and the company do not agree that 
such person is legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from the owner or operator of an uninsured 
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automobile because of bodily injury to the in-
sured or do not agree as to the amount of pay-
ment 'which may be owing under this coverage, 
then, upon written demand of either, the matter 
or matters upon which such person and the com-
pany do not agree shall be settled by arbitration 
in accordance with the rules of the American Arbi-
tration Association, and judgment upon the award 
rendered by the Arbitrators may be entered in 
any court having jurisdiction thereof. Such per-
son and the company each agree to consider itself 
bound and to be bound by any award made by 
the- arbitrators pursuant to this endorsement. 
* * * * * * 
"9. Action Against Company: No action shall 
lie against the company unless, as a condition 
precedent thereto, the insured or his legal repre-
sentative has fully complied with all the terms of 
this endorsement nor unless within one year from 
the date of the accident: 
* * * * * * 
" (c) the insured or his legal representative 
has formally instituted arbitration proceedings." 
(Emphasis ours.) (Ex. 1.) 
It was stipulated that the defendant had filed a 
demand for arbitration before the time of trial, and that 
plaintiffs refused to submit to arhitration claiming that 
they were not required to do so under Utah law. (Tr. 63). 
Following a trial on the merits, the court ordered 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defend-
ant in the amount of $6,182;.50. (R. 40, 49). A motion 
to set aside the judgment and to enter judgment for the 
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defPndant, or in the altrnative for a new trial, was denied 
by the eonrt. (R. 46, 48, 53). This appeal followed. (R. 
50). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 
AND AGAINST LAW. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE ISSUE 
OF ITS LIABILITY TO PLAINTIFFS, AND THE AMOUNT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S LOSS DETERMINED BY ARBITRATION 
PROCEEDINGS. 
This case squarely raises for decison by this court, 
the issue of the enforceability of the arbitration provi-
sions of the Uninsured Motorist coverage. This is an 
issue of considerable importance to the insurance indus-
try, not only in Utah, but elsewhere in the nation. It is 
an issue which has been treated only by a few appellate 
courts in the country, none of which have the same 
general arbitration law as Utah. However, there are 
n1any other states which do have similar statutes, and 
the decision of this court in this case will no doubt 
become a landmark in this field of the law. 
The Uninsured Motorist coverage is a relatively new 
type of coverage, devised by the insurance industry in 
an attempt to furnish some protection, at nominal cost, 
to the innocent victim of an accident caused by the neg-
ligence of an uninsured motorist, or a hit-run driver. 
This coverage must still be considered as being in the 
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experimental stage. Some authoritative disucssion on 
its background may be helpful to the court. See Plum-
mer's article in the Insurance Law Journal, A ngust, 
1957, 494: 
"The history of the 'innocent victim' or the 
'uninsured motorist' coverages is short but popu-
lar. It really began in January, 1954, when a few 
insurance companies added the 'unsatisfied judg-
ment' endorsement to their standard form auto-
mobile liability policies at a premium range from 
$5 to $7.50. Most of the endorsements covered 
bodily injury - no property damage - and would 
pay after the claim was reduced to judgment. * * * 
* * * * * * 
"It was in December, 1956, that the National 
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual 
Insurance Rating Bureau drafted and promul-
gated an endorsement that could only be attached 
to the family automobile policy. It provided cov-
erage only for bodily injuries with maximum lim-
its being the same as the financial responsibility 
law requirements (with a premium range from 
$3 to $12). The National Bureau named it the 
'Family Protection-Auton1obile Coverage' and the 
Mutual Bureau gave it the title of 'Fa1nily Pro-
tection against Uninsured Motorists.' * * *" 
See also the paper on this subject delivered at the 
1960 Annual Meeting of the Section of Insurance, Neg-
ligence, and Compensation Law of the American Bar 
Association, reported in the official report of those pro-
ceedings at pages 281 and 282 : 
"Th~ history an~ evolution of the Coverage 
began w1th the pubhc concern for the innocent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
vieti m who 1nust shoulder the burden of his in-
juries caused by the negligent wrongdoer and the 
financially irresponsible uninsured 1notorist. In 
the years between 1925 and 1954 the various state 
legislatures atte1npted to reduce the ntunber of 
uncompensated victilns by enacting motorist re-
sponsibility laws. They sought to distribute this 
responsibility throughout the motoring public by 
requiring the owners to post financial security 
with the state. * * * Each plan had 1nerit and 
many were incorporated in the various State Fi-
nancial Responsibility Laws. * * * There is and 
continues to be considerable debate over the Iner-
its of the various plans to meet public responsi-
bility for the pay1nent of the claims and judg-
ments against the uninsured and irresponsible 
motorists. Still, the gap was not closed in com-
pensating the injured against the drivers whose 
companies denied liability for lack of permission 
to drive by the owner and for want of insured's 
cooperation. In other words, there were still a 
great number of unsatsfied judgment creditors 
who were not cmnpensated for injuries received. 
* * * Private companies showed little interest and 
they did not begin to accept the 'public responsi-
bility' until January, 1954. At that time the in-
surance industry becmne interested in devising a 
plan to compensate injured parties. Pressure of 
public opinion continued to increase, but the com-
panies were not too quick to accept the challenge 
because of possible political meddling, rate and 
underwriting problems, operating expenses, etc. 
They planned and wrote an uninsured coverage 
provision in the policy within the frame work of 
the present private insurance principle without 
too great an increase in premium cost, within the 
administration of justice and rules of tort lia-
bility. * * *" 
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The significance and importance of the arbitration 
feature of this coverage was explained by Fieting in 
Best's Insurance News, Fire and Casualty edition, Octo-
ber, 1961, at page 57: 
'''Provision for arbitrating what were antici-
pated to likely be the most common kinds of dis-
agreements between insurance companies and 
their insureds under uninsured motorists coverage 
has been part and parcel of this form of insur-
ance ever since its inception in New York State 
back in 1955. It recognizes the desirability of and 
is designed to accomplish these things : 
"1. Provide a speedy, just and economical 
means for determining the amount of the insurer's 
payment liability. 
"2. Avoid the necessity for and disadvan-
tages of litigation with the uninsured motorist 
prior to settlement of claims under this coverage. 
"3. Leave the legal status of the uninsured 
motorist's liability to respond in damages unaf-
fected by any action or proceedings taken in dis-
position of an insured's claim under this coverage. 
"Basic to Coverage 
aThe basic arbitration requirement is part of 
the very grant of coverage, the insuring agree-
ment specifying that 'determination as to whether 
the insured ... is legally entitled to recover ... 
damages, and if so, the amount thereof, shall be 
made by agreement between the insured . . . and 
the company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitra-
tion. Means for implementation of this arbitra-
tion requirement and objective are contained in 
two additional policy (or endorsement) provi-
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sion~. One of thP~P ~1wcifies the A1nerican Arbi-
tration A~~<wiation a~ the tribunal for any arbi-
tration, and 1nakes the arbitrators' awards bind-
ing on the parties even to the extent of pennitting 
entry of judgment on such awards. The other 
makes full compliance with all tern1s of the un-
insured motorists coverage a condition precedent 
to any action against the con1pany. 
'}(<***** 
"The language employed can leave no doubt 
but that as to liability (as distinguished frmn 
coverage) and as to the amount of recoverable 
dmnages, the policy or endorsmnent makes arbi-
tration of an uninsured motorist's claim compul-
sory at the option of either the insured or the 
insurance company. The policy language in this 
respect, in effect, undertakes to abrogate the right 
of either party to sue the other in courts of law 
on such disputed questions. 
"What about questions as to whether this 
coverage applies at all to an asserted claim~ What 
about a claim denied by the insurance company 
on the ground that the automobile which struck 
the insured was not in fact an 'uninsured auto-
mobilef Or, what if the insurance con1pany denies 
that the injured person qualifies as an 'insured' 
and consequently, is not a beneficiary of this 
coverage~ Can arbitration of such coverage ques-
tions be required~ Can an 'insured' or alleged 
insured compel the insurance company to proceed 
with arbitration of disputed questions of liability 
and damages while such coverage questions re-
main unresolved~ 
"There manifestly is no reference in any of 
the policy or endorsement provisions to arbitra-
tion of such coverage question and disagreements. 
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It consequently was quite properly assumed and 
continues to be the position of the insurance com-
panies that coverage questions, as distinguished 
from liability and damage issues, are not subject 
to compulsory arbitration and, unless both parties 
agree to arbitrate such differences, they must be 
determined in appropriate court proceedings. The 
New York case law, originally developed accord-
ingly and early tended to establish these proposi-
tions: 
"1. Only disagreements between insured and 
insurance company relating to the legal liability 
of the uninsured motorist and the amount of the 
insured's damages must be arbitrated. 
"2. Other disagreements - those relating to 
application of the coverage - may be litigated 
in courts of law or equity." (Emphasis ours.) 
In light of these considerations, we proceed to an 
examination of the law. There appears to be a misconcep-
tion among the bench and bar generally of this State, that 
any contract to submit to arbitration a dispute of any 
issue which may arise in the future under contractual 
agreement, is unenforceable. We do not believe that any 
decision of this court has gone so far. A careful reading 
of the earlier decisions of this court will reveal that they 
are not out of harmony wth general principles regarding 
arbitration in other states. We shall later examine the 
Utah authorities in detail, but first we turn to some 
general principles. 
In 5 Am. J ur. 2d 535, Arbitration and Award, Sec. 30, 
the following rule is set forth: 
·"Where a contract contains a stipulation that 
the decision of arbitrators on certain questions 
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shall be a condition precede1z.t to the right of 
action on the co}/tract itself, such stipulat-io11 zcill 
be enforced, and until the method adopted has 
been pursued, or some sufficient reason given for 
not pursuing it, no action can be brought on thr. 
contract. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
In tlw sa1ne article at page 573, Sec. 72, the following 
rule is set forth: 
"Notwithstanding the general rule that an 
unperformed abritration agreen1ent will not bar 
a suit on the same subject matter, if a party's 
right to bring suit is validly conditioned on a11 
award of abritrators or appraisers respecting dif-
ferences as to certain factual matters, the courts 
will not take j~wisdiction of his suit until he has 
complied with the condition precedent or is legally 
excused therefrom. If the arbitration fails through 
the fault of the suing party, it is a bar to his 
action. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
And at pages 57 4-5 of the same work, the following 
language is found: 
"As a general rule, if the terms of the con-
tract expressly or by necessary implication re-
quire an award on a preliminary question abso-
lutely and in any event before a suit may be 
brought, it is incumbent on the suitor, under 
penalty of not stating a cause of action, affirma-
tively to plead and prove his perforn1ance of the 
condition, or, by appropriate specific allegations, 
affirmatively to excuse his nonperformance. On 
the other hand, if arbitration is not of the es-
sence of the contract, but is to proceed, according 
to the terms of the agreement, only on occur-
rence of a contingency, such as an actual dis-
agreement on the arbitrable question, or the re-
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quest of one of the parties, the failure of the 
arbitration is matter of defense to be pleaded and 
proved in order to defeat a recovery. Although 
there is authority to the contrary, where arbi-
tration is a condition precedent, in order to bar 
a suit, it is ordinarily sufficient to set up the 
agreement and nonperformance thereof through 
fault of the party bringing suit, since the agree-
ment, if valid, is concerned only with ascertain-
ment of preliminary facts, and not with liability, 
and the award will be evidence of such facts but 
will not itself support an action." 
Seealso 29'A Am. Jur. 699, Insurance Sec.1611: 
·"In accordance with general principles ap-
plicable to all contracts, it is the rule that a pro-
vision in an insurance policy that all disputes 
arising under the policy shall be submitted to 
arbitrators, or a provision similar in substanqe 
and effect, is not binding. On the other hand, the 
view prevailing in nearly all jurisdictions is that 
a stipulation not ousting the jurisdiction of the 
courts, but leaving the general question of liability 
for a loss to be judicially determined, and sim-
ply providing a reasonable method of estimating 
and ascertaining the amount of the loss, is valid." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
Many courts in construing insurance contracts have 
held in accordance with the principles above set forth. 
In Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 
136 U.S. 242, 34 L.ed. 419, 10 S.Ct. 945, the Supreme 
Court of the United States said: 
"'The c?nditions of ~he policy ~n suit clearly 
and unequivocally manifest the Intention and 
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agreement of the parties to the contract of insur-
ance that any difference arising between thmn as 
to the a1nount of loss or damage of the property 
insured shall be submitted at the request, in writ-
ing of either party, to the appraisal of cmnpetent 
and impartial persons to be chosen as therein 
provided, whose award shall be conclusive as to 
the amount of such loss or damage only, and shall 
not determine the question of liability of the 
company; that the company shall have the right 
to take the whole or any part of the property at 
its appraised value so ascertained, and that until 
such an appraisal shall have been permitted, and 
such an award obtained, the loss shall not be 
payable and no action shall lie against the com-
pany. ·The appraisal, when requested in writing 
by either party, is distinctly made a condition 
maintenance of any action. Such a stipulation, not 
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, but leaving 
the general question of liability to be judicially de-
termined and simply providing a reasonable meth-
od of esti1nating and ascertaining the an1ount of 
the loss, is unquestionably valid, according to the 
uniform current of authority in England and 
this country .... The case con1es within the general 
rule long ago laid down by this court : 'Where the 
parties, in their contract, fix on a certain n1ode 
by which the amount be paid shall be ascertained, 
as in the present case, the party that seeks an 
enforcement of the agreement must show that he 
has done everything on his part which could 
be done to carry it into effect. He cannot compel 
the payment of the amount claimed unless he 
shall procure the kind of evidence required by 
the contract, or show· that by time or accident 
he is unable to do so .... [T] he defendant ex-
plicitly and repeatedly, in writing, requested that 
the amount of the loss or damage should be sub-
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n1itted to appraisers, in accordance with the terms 
of the policy, and . . . the plaintiff has as often 
peremptorily refused to do this. . . . The court, 
therefore rightly instructed the jury that the 
defendant had requested in writing, and the plain-
tiff had declined, the appraisal provided in the 
policy, and that the plaintiff therefore could not 
maintain this action." 
In Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 202 Ala. 384, 80 So. 
466, the Alabama Court said : 
"A covenant in a contract, whether of insur-
ance or of other matters, to submit every matter 
of dispute between the parties, growing out of 
such contract, to arbitration or to a board of 
appraisers, to the end of defeating the jurisdic-
tion of courts as to the subject-matter, are uni-
versally held to be void, as against public policy . 
. . . Agreements, however, which merely provide 
a mode or manner for ascertaining the value of 
property or the amount of damages, losses, or 
profits, are valid, and may be made conditions 
precedent to the right of action to recover dam-
ages based on such values, dan1ages, losses or 
profits. . . . The clause of the insurance policy 
in question falls within the latter class, and is 
valid and enforceable. The policy of this state 
favors arbitration and amicable settlement of dif-
ferences between parties; but it does not fa.vor 
or allow agreements in advance to oust or defeat 
the jurisdiction of all courts, as to all differences 
between parties . ... 
"Where the contract explicitly Inakes the de-
termination by arbitration of an1ounts Yalues 
qualities, etc., a condition precedent to tl1e n1ain~ 
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tunance of an action, it is binding, as in insurance 
. contracts, . . . 
"If parties to contracts of insurance con•nant 
that in case of disagreement as to the an1ount of 
the loss or damages, or the value of the property 
destroyed or damaged, they will submit such dif-
ferences to disinterested parties as appraisers, 
arbitrators, or umpires, . . . and rnake an award 
of such parties a prerequisite to the bringing of 
a suit on such insurance policy, such covenant or 
agreement is valid, and will be enforced by the 
courts, ... " (Emphasis ours.) 
In St. Paul F. & M. Insurance Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 
129 Tenn. 55, 164 S.W. 1186, the Tennessee court said: 
"When there is an arbitration clause in sub-
stance like the one we have described, it is the 
duty of either party to comply and appoint an 
arbitrator, when requested so to do by the other 
party. If the insured fails to comply with this 
demand, he cannot sue on the policy, and, if the 
refusal be persisted in for an unreasonable time, 
it will amount to a forfeiture of the policy." 
In Fisher v. Merchants Insurance Co., 95 Me. 486, 
60 A2d 82, the Court said : 
"While it has long been settled in this country 
and in England that a stipulation in a contract 
providing for the settlement by arbitration of all 
controversies and disputes that might subsequent-
ly arise between the parties is invalid, because 
its effect would be to oust the courts of their 
jurisdiction, it is equally well settled that if the 
arbitration agreement relates only to the deter-
mination of some preliminary 1natter, such as the 
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amount of damages to be recovered, and does not 
apply to the whole question of liability, such pro-
vision when a reasonable and definite method 
is pro~ided for choosing the arbitrators is valid 
and enforceable." 
That court also quoted from Stephenson v. Ins. Co.,· 
54 Me. 55, as follows : 
" 'While parties may impose, as a condition 
precedent to application to the courts, that they 
shall first have settled the amount to be recovered 
by an agreed mode, they cannot entirely close the 
access to the courts of law.' This doctrine has 
become so universally recognized by the courts 
that it is unnecessary to refer to further authori-
ties in support. 
* * * * * * 
"And it is settled beyond controversy that, 
when the contract provides that no action upon 
it shall be maintained until after such an a\Yard, 
then the award is a condition precedent to the 
right of action." 
Before turning to the decisions of this court, we 
also invite attention to the '.vell considered opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of Park Con-
struction Co. v. Independent School District No. 32, 296 
NW 4!75. ·The court there said: 
"The historical and only basis for the opinion 
that executory agreen1ents to arbitrate all issues 
to arise under the contract are void, as against 
public policy, is open to serious question. There 
is eminent authority . . . that the rule was the 
product of judicial jealousy rather than judicial 
reasoning .... [I]t arose in the time when the 
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emoluments of the judges depended Inainl)~, or 
almost entirely, upon fees.' In those days they had 
no fixed salary and so there was great competi-
tion to get as much as possible of litigation into 
Westminster Hall, and a great scramble . . . for 
the division of the spoil.' In consequence, they 
had great jealousy of arbitrations ... they said 
that the courts ought not to be ousted of their 
jurisdiction, and that it was, contrary to the policy 
of the law to do so.' 
"To that doctrine, its questionable origin 
aside, there are two destructive objections: 
"First, there appears never to have been any 
factual basis for holding that an agreement to 
arbitrate 'ousted' jurisdiction. It has no effect 
upon the jurisdiction of any court. Arbitration 
simply removes a controversy from the arena of 
litigation. It is no more an ouster of judicial 
jurisdiction than is a compromise and settle1nent 
or that peculiar offspring of legal ingenuity 
known as the covenant not to sue. Each disposes 
of issues without litigation which no more than 
the other ousts the courts of jurisdiction. . . . 
" ''The decision by arbitration is the decision 
of a tribunal of the parties' own choice and erec-
. tion ... The tribunal is one that they have a legal 
right to erect. That being so, what self justifica-
tion can judges assert for nullifying such rightful 
choice. In the field of industry, a chorus of de-
served derision would silence declaration that a 
collective bargaining agreement for arbitration of 
future issues was violative of public policy. 
"Second, if there ever was public policy 
against agreements to arbitrate, it has disap~ 
peared. Now the policy of this state, as declared 
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by the legislature, . . . and applied by this court 
. favors arbitration. 
* * * * * * 
"Here . . . our conclusion opposes that of 
many earlier decisions of this court insofar as 
they have ruled that a general agreement to arbi-
trate all differences to arise under a contract is 
contrary to public policy and therefore void, they 
are overruled .... They are disapproved notwith-
standing their accord with a prevailing view of 
decision law elsewhere. 
''For this departure from a doctrine of long 
standing, we make no apology. To us the reasons 
assigned are so compelling as to allow no other 
course. 
* * * * * * 
''So long as an award of arbitrators is en-
forceable by action, it is automatically subject to 
enough of court review." 
In order to give force and effect to the arbitration 
provisions of the policy here involved, it is not necessary 
for this court to go as far as the ~Ennesota court has 
gone. Indeed, as we shall den1onstrate, it is not necessary 
for this court to depart fron1 its previous holdings. 
However, some words of elucidation by this court would 
no doubt be helpful to the trial bench and bar. 
There appear to be three earlier decisions from the 
Court bearing on this question. The first of these was 
Fox Film Corporation v. Ogden Theatre Co. 82 Ut. 279, 
17 P.2d 294. This court there said: 
"Arbitration provisions in contracts are verv 
generally held to be severable from the body df 
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the contract. Arbitration provision~ of the kind 
in question, that is, those types that are in no 
wise connected with the promises each })(t rty 
makes to the other, but which on the contrary 
look to the future and provide a method of arbi-
trating disputes that may arise, are by practically 
all courts held to be severable provisions. * * * 
An agreement in a contract to arbitrate disputes 
that may arise is not a part of the substance of 
the contract. It pertains to remedy only, and is 
collateral to the contractual matters. The con-
tract was not made for the purpose of bringing 
about the arbitration. * * * 
"We are of the opinion that the arbitration 
provisions in the contract at bar deal wholly with 
a method of procedure and are therefore severable 
from the body of the contract that fixes the obli-
gations of the parties." (Emphasis ours.) 
The inference naturally to be drawn frmn the quoted 
language is that where the arbitration agree1nent is in-
extricably interwoven with the substance of the contrac-
tual agree1nent, and is part of the consideration therefor, 
as is the situation here, it will be enforceable. One of 
the basic considerations which influenced the insurance 
industry to make this coverage available to the 1notoring 
public at a nominal rate was that claims thereunder could 
be handled at minimal expense through arbitration pro-
ceedings, rather than by the comparatively expensive 
process of litigation. 
The second Utah case is Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 
89 Ut. 580, 57 P.2d 1132. In that case this court quoted 
with approval from Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 190 Cal. 
664, 214 P. 38, 41, 26 A.L.R. 1070, as follows: 
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"The provision for arbitration in the case 
at bar being one covering all disputes thereafter 
to ari~e under the contract, and not being con-
fined to the ascertainment of a fact essential to 
the existence of the cause of a.ction itself, comes 
clearly within the general rule that it is not bind-
ing upon either party to it." (Emphasis ours.) 
The type of contract there discussed was entirely dif-
ferent from the one in the case at bar. Again we invite 
attention to the fact that the arbitration provision in 
he Uninsured l\1otorist coverage does not purport to 
require arbitration of all disputes arising under the in-
surance contract. On the contrary, by its express terms, 
it is limited to certain types of disputes arising under 
Uninsured Motorist coverage only. There is, for ex-
ample, no provision for arbitration of disputes arising 
under the liability coverage provisions of the policy, nor 
under the physical dan1age provisions of the policy; nor 
the medical payments coverage of the policy form. 
Neither do its provisions purport to require arbitra-
tion of all disputes under the Uninsured l\1otorist cov-
erage itself. For exmnple, the parties are not required 
to arbitrate the question of timeliness of the notice of 
the claim. See 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Prac-
tice, Sec. 4331, supplement page 12: 
"·The question of timeliness of notice of claim 
is not within the purview of arbitration clause." 
See also Application of M.-v.A.I.C., 226 NYS2d 285. 
Likewise a dispute as to whether the clain1ant is 
an insured within the meaning of the lJninsured l\Iotorist 
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coverag<' i~ not subjed to arbitration. See 7 Applenmn, 
InsnraneP Law nlHl Practice, See. -±~331, supplen1ent page 
12: 
"A dispute relating to status of a clai1nant 
as an insured within coverage of policy was not 
within arbitration provision of uninsured motor-
ist endorsement." 
Se also McGuinness v. M.Y.A.I.C., 225 NYS2d 36, 
Syllabus 3: 
"A dispute relating to status of a clailnant 
under an automobile policy as an insured was 
not a dispute within the arbitration provision of 
the uninsured motorist coverage of policy." 
Again the question of whether the vehicle involved 
was in fact uninsured is not an issue subject to arbi-
tration under the Uninsured Motorist coverage. See 7 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 4331, page 
215: 
"It has presently been held that the parties 
are not bound to arbitrate the question of whether 
or not the vehicle in question was in fact unin-
sured - as to that issue, declaratory judgment 
would be a proper remedy." 
To the same effect see Mithewitz v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 198 N.Y.S.2d 101, and Application of Allstate Ins. 
Co., 207 N.Y.S.2d 645. See also Merchants Mutual Cas-
ualty Co. v. Wildman, 197 N.Y.S.2d 925. 
In fact, of all of the issues which might arise under 
the contract of insurance, only two are made the subject 
of arbitration. These are the questions of (a) whether 
there is liability on the part of the uninsured motorist 
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to the claimant; and (h) the amount of damages the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover. See 1\Iurtaugh v. Ameri-
can State Ins. Co., ( 0. App.), 187 NE2d 518: 
"Only the two special issues [liability and 
damages] agreed to be arbitrated can be arbi-
trated. All other questions of law and fact were 
not submitted." 
Quite obviously the arbitration provision of this in-
surance contract does not purport to make all future 
disputes between the parties the subject of arbitration, 
but merely to make two particular questions under one 
particular coverage, the subject of arbitration. This is 
not the type of arbitration provision which this court 
refused to enforce in Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff. 
Apparently the most recent expression of this court 
1n this field, is that contained in the case of Latter v. 
Holsum Bread Co., 108 Ut. 364, 160 P.2d 421. In that 
case this court refused to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment which required arbitration of all future disputes 
with the following language: 
"It is almost the universal rule that in the 
absence of a statute to the contrary, an agreement 
to arbitrate all future disputes thereafter arising 
under the contract does not constitute a bar to 
an action on the contract involving such dispute, 
on the ground that it seeks to deny to the parties 
judicial remedies and therefore is contrary to 
public policy. * * *" (En1phasis ours.) 
In a forward-looking concurring opinion, Justice 
Wolfe made the following comments : 
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''In Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 
57 P.~d 1132, we affirmed the connnon law rule 
rdativP to commercial arbitration agree1nents. 
HowPvPr, there is no reason to interject that smne 
rule into other fields of law unless con1pelled to 
do so by legislation. We shottld not hesitate to 
make o1.uselves free from this rule ttchenever leg-
islation indica,tes a change in public policy. In 
the absence of legislation to the contrary, courts 
should not hold that arbitration of disputes aris-
ing out of labor contracts are un-enforceable as 
against public policy. 
* * * * * * 
"Court hostility to arbitration may in the 
past have had a restrictive influence on our arbi-
tration statute. It is time that courts generally 
evidence a change in attitude to encourage rather 
than discourage Hse of arbitration machinery in 
cases where such machinery is well adapted. * * *" 
(Emphasis ours.) 
We invite also attention to certain provisions of 
the Insurance Code. Sec. 31-19-9, U.C.A. 1953, provides 
in part as follows: 
"No insurance policy form) other than a 
surety bond form or application form where writ-
ten application is required, or rider form, per-
taining thereto shall be isstted) delivered) or used 
unless it has been filed with and approved by the 
commissioner." (Emphasis ours.) 
Sec. 31-19-10, lT.C.A. 1953, provides, insofar as ma-
terial here, as follows: 
"The commissioner shall disapprove any such 
form of insurance policy, application, rider, or 
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endorsement, or withdraw any previous approval 
thereof, only 
"(1) if it is in any respect in violation of or 
does not comply with this code; * * *" (Emphasis 
ours.)' 
Sec. 31-19-11, U.C.A. 1953, provides, insofar as ma-
terial here, as follows: 
"('1) The written instrument, in which a con-
tract of insurance is set forth, is the policy. 
"(2) A policy shall specify: 
"(g) the conditions pertaining to the insur-
ance." (Emphasis ours.) 
It is apparent that the form here involved is one 
which has had the approval of the Insurance Commis-
sioner. The fact that the Commissioner has not dis-
approved it, gives it, at least prima facie, the stamp of 
validity under Sec. 31-19-10, U.C.A. 1953. The form 
sets forth the conditions pertaining to the insurance as 
required by Sec. 31-19-11, U.C.A. 1953. The form there-
fore has the sanction of statute and cannot be said to 
be out of harmony with the public policy of this state. 
In summary, we suggest that: 
1. 'The arbitration provisions of the insurance policy 
under consideration are liinited in scope, and do not 
purport to require arbitration of all disputed issues, but 
only of two issues which might arise under one coverage 
only, of an insurance contract form which affords many 
different coverages. 
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2. The fonn has the aproval of the Insurance Cmn-
Inissioner, in accordanee with Legislative require1nent, 
and is therefore not contrary to public policy. 
3. The 1110dern trend of decision is to recognize 
and enforce arbitration agremnents which do not offend 
against general public policy. 
-t. Enforcement of this arbitration agreement would 
not represent a departure from the public policy of this 
state, nor a departure frmn the rules of decision previ-
ously laid down by this court, but on the contrary would 
be in hannony with the rules of decision of this court. 
5. The arbitration agreement is limited in scope; 
is in hannony with public policy; is harmonious with 
the applicable statutes of this state; is harmonious with 
the previous decisions of this court, and therefore, valid 
and enforceable. 
Plaintiff adinittedly failed to cmnply with a condi-
tion precedent provided by the contract of insurance on 
which she based her claim, and having so failed, she 
has no standing to maintain this action, and the judg-
ment in her favor should be reversed and set aside. 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 
AND AGAINST LAW. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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Section 41-6-63.10 U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
'''Whenever a highway has been divided into 
two separate roadways by a dividing section, it 
shall be unlawful to drive any vehicle upon any 
such highway except to the right of such dividing 
section, or to drive any vehicle over, upon, or1 
across any such dividing section or to make any 
left turn or semi-circular or U-turn on any such 
divided highway, except through a plainly marked 
opening in such dividing section designed and des-
ignated for such left turn, semicircular or U -turn, 
unless a sign or signs authorized and displayed 
by the state road commission or other govern-
mental agency shall otherwise indicate. 
''A dividing section shall divide a highway 
into two separate roadways, and shall consist of: 
* * * * * * 
"(3) A dividing area of over two feet in 
width defined by either 
" (a) A standard double line marking on each 
side of the dividing section, each double line rnark-
ing consisting of two four-inch wide lines four 
inches apart,* * *" 
The undisputed evidence in this case establishes that 
at the place where the accident occurred, the highway 
was divided into two separate roadways by a dividing 
section as defined in the statute. Although there was an 
opening or break in the divider in the vicinity where 
the accident occurred, the evidence establishes without 
any dispute that the plaintiff had passed beyond the 
opening where a left hand turn could lawfully have been 
made, and had proceeded to a point 82 feet south of the 
opening, where she had stopped intending to execute a 
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l(·ft hand turn whPn there \vas an opening in oncmning 
traffi<". In short, plaintiff by her own ad1nission was in 
the act of violating the statute above cited. In so doing 
she was clearly guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law, and for that reason the judgment in her 
favor should be reversed. 
It is well settled in this state that the violation of 
a statute or ordinance which fixes a standard of care 
and is designed for the protection of the public or a por-
tion thereof is negligence as a matter of law. See Smith 
v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., 32 Utah 21, 88 P. 683; 
Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 47 4, 69 P.2d 502. 
That rule has been held fully applicable to violations of 
statutes for the control of motor vehicle traffic in the 
case of North v. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516, 229 P.2d 871, 
where this court said: 
"The stattttes were promulgated for the pro-
tection of the pnblic and to safeguard property, 
life and limb of persons 'Lts£ng the highways fro1n 
accidents of the type here invol~·cd. Violation of 
these statutes then, constitutes negligence in law. 
This doctrine of law has been steadfastly adhered 
to by this court and generally in other courts 
throughout the United States. * * * 
"Plaintiff's violation of the statutory stand-
ard of care here involved, bars recovery if the 
violation was a proximate contributing cause of 
the injury." (Emphasis ours.) 
It is no answer to say that questions of negligence 
and contributory negligence are generally for jury de-
termination. While this is manifestly true where there 
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is a conflict in the evidence, no conflict exists here. What 
occurred is established by the undisputed testimony of 
the plaintiff herself, by which she is hound. There is 
neither a conflict in evidence to he resolved, nor are there 
different inferences to be drawn from the undisputed 
evidence. Neither is this an area where the trier of 
fact may say what a reasonable person would have done· 
under the circumstances. The legislature has specifically 
prescribed what all persons shall do under the circum-
stances here prevailing. Plaintiff clearly did not con-
form to the legislative standard. Her failure to do so• 
under the law of this state is negligence as a matter of 
law barring her recovery in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff admittedly failed to comply with a con-
dition precedent stipulated in her contract of insurance 
for the bringing of an action against her insurer, the 
defendant in this case. Said stipulation was in harmony 
with the public policy of this state, and was valid and 
enforceable, and by reason thereof, plaintiff is debarred 
from maintaining this action. The evidence further 
shows that she was guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law. The judgment should be reversed with 
directions to enter judgn1ent in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN 
BY RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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